Abstract. There is growing interest in the use of grid-level storage to smooth variations in supply that are likely to arise with increased use of wind and solar energy. Battery arbitrage, the process of buying, storing, and selling electricity to exploit variations in electricity spot prices, is becoming an important way of paying for expensive investments into grid level storage. Independent system operators such as the NYISO (New York Independent System Operator) require that battery storage operators place bids into an hour-ahead market (although settlements may occur in increments as small as 5 minutes, which is considered near "real-time"). The operator has to place these bids without knowing the energy level in the battery at the beginning of the hour, while simultaneously accounting for the value of left-over energy at the end of the hour. The problem is formulated using the dynamic programming framework. We describe and employ a convergent approximate dynamic programming (ADP) algorithm that exploits monotonicity of the value functions to find a profitable bidding policy.
Introduction
Bidding into the electricity market can be a complicated process, mainly due to the requirement of balancing supply and demand at each point in the grid. To solve this issue, the Independent System Operators (ISOs) and the Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) generally use multi-settlement markets: several tiers of markets covering planning horizons that range from day-ahead to real-time. The idea is that the markets further away from the operating time settle the majority of the generation needed to handle the predicted load, while the markets closer to the operating time correct for the small, yet unpredictable deviations that may be caused by issues like weather, transmission problems, and generation outages (see, for example, Eydeland and Wolyniec [2003] , Harris [2006] , Shahidehpour et al. [2002] , for more details). Settlements in these real-time markets are based on a set of intrahour prices, typically computed at 5, 10, or 15 minute intervals, depending on the specific market in question. A settlement refers to the financial transaction after a generator clears the market, which refers to being selected to either buy or sell energy from the market. If a generator does not clear the market, it remains idle and no settlement occurs. We refer to this situation as being out of the market.
Many ISO's and RTO's, such as the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM), deal with the balancing market primarily through the day-ahead market. PJM's balancing market clears every 5 minutes (considered to be near-real-time), but the bids are all placed the previous day. See Eydeland and Wolyniec [2003] and the PJM Energy and Ancillary Services Market Operations Manual for more information. In certain markets, however, it is not only possible to settle in real-time, but market participants can also submit bids each hour, for an hour in the future. Thus, a bid (consisting of buy and sell prices) can be made at 1pm that will govern the battery between 2pm and 3pm. The process of both bidding and settling in real-time is a characteristic of the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) real-time market and is the motivating example for this paper. Other prominent examples of markets that include a real-time bidding aspect include California ISO (CAISO) and Midcontinent ISO (MISO). Due to both the higher volatility of realtime prices versus day-ahead prices (and hence, more opportunities for profit) and the more interesting sequential nature of the hour-ahead bidding problem (rather than placing bids for all 24 hours at once), we consider in this study the real-time market only. In particular, our goal is to pair battery storage with hour-ahead bidding in the real-time market for profit maximization, a strategy sometimes referred to as battery arbitrage.
It is unlikely that profits from battery arbitrage alone can be sustainable for a company; however, if performed optimally, it can be an important part of a range of profit generating activities (one such example is the frequency regulation market). See Walawalkar et al. [2007] for an economic analysis of using a storage device for both energy arbitrage (using a simple "charge-off-peak and discharge-on-peak" policy) and frequency regulation in the New York area. Their analysis shows that in New York City (but not the surrounding areas), there is a "high probability of positive NPV [net present value] for both energy arbitrage and regulation," but even so, there is still significant risk in not being able to recover the initial capital cost. However, the potential for more efficient and cost-effective technology combined with better control policies can make energy arbitrage feasible in the near future.
In our problem, we assume that the goal is to optimally control a 1 MW battery; in practice, a company may operate a fleet of such batteries. Market rules state that we must bid in integer increments, meaning the possible actions at each settlement are to charge, discharge (both at a rate of 1 MW), or do nothing. Hence, our precise problem is to optimize the placement of two hour-ahead bids, a "positive" bid (for a quantity of +1 MW) and a "negative" bid (for a quantity of −1 MW) that correspond to selling (generation) and buying (negative generation), respectively, over a period of time such that purchased energy can be stored in the finite capacity battery. The stored energy can be carried over from hour to hour and sold at a future time. The objective is to maximize the expected profits over a given time horizon. In this specific situation where we only bid for two quantities, we sell to the market when the spot price of electricity rises above our sell bid or we buy from the market when it falls below our buy bid. There is an undersupply penalty when we are unable to deliver to the market (i.e., when the battery is empty) that is proportional to the price. Further, we assume no price impact (i.e., our bids do not affect the spot prices of electricity).
The bidding timelines instituted by different markets generally have similar characteristics, but each market also has its own idiosyncrasies; here we take the NYISO as an example. In this real-time market, bidding for the operating hour closes an hour in advance and furthermore, the hour-ahead bid is fixed for the entire operating hour. The mathematical model for bidding in this market is developed in Section 3. This paper makes the following contributions. We describe, in detail, a mathematical model of the bidding process in the real-time electricity market and formulate the sequential decision problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Along the way, we show the structural properties of the problem (monotonicity of the contribution and value functions) that we utilize in our solution technique. Next, we describe a convergent approximate dynamic programming algorithm called Monotone-ADP (M-ADP) (Jiang and Powell [2013] ) that can be used to obtain an approximate, but near-optimal bidding policy. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the ADP algorithm through empirical results (both results from benchmarking the algorithm on a simple model and results from real spot price data).
Literature Review
With renewable energy sources like wind and solar becoming more established, the problem of energy storage is also becoming increasingly important. In this section, we first review studies dedicated solely to storage and then move on to those that consider the bidding aspect. Lastly, we discuss algorithmic techniques similar to our proposed method (Monotone-ADP).
Coupling wind energy with storage has been well-studied in a variety of ways. The paper by Kim and Powell [2011] poses a wind energy commitment problem given storage and then analytically determines the optimal policy for the infinite horizon case. Sioshansi [2011] uses ideas from economics and game theory (i.e., the Stackelberg Model) to make several conclusions, including the finding that the value of storage increases with marketcompetitiveness. In addition, Greenblatt et al. [2007] found that for high green house gas (GHG) emissions prices, compressed air energy storage is a better choice as a supplemental generator to wind energy when compared to natural gas turbines. The well-known smoothing effects of energy storage on intermittent renewable sources is studied in the context of wind power output by Paatero and Lund [2005] .
Another problem within this realm is the storage of natural gas, which involves optimally controlling injection and withdrawal of gas from a storage facility that is typically underground. Carmona and Ludkovski [2010] use a technique known as "optimal switching" to solve a natural gas storage problem; computationally, they use an approximation strategy for the value functions that involves basis functions. In a similar vein, Thompson et al. [2009] formulate the problem using stochastic control and numerically solve the resulting integro-differential equation to arrive at the optimal policy. Lai et al. [2010] propose using an ADP algorithm along with an approximation technique to reduce the number of state space dimensions for natural gas storage valuation.
Other energy storage problems include reservoir management (see Nandalal and Bogardi [2007] ) and pairing solar with battery storage (see Barnhart et al. [2013] ). It quickly becomes clear that all of these problems are similar; in fact, Secomandi [2010] gives the structure of the optimal policy for trading generic commodities given storage. At its core, energy storage has similarities to an array of classical problems related to operations research, such as resource allocation (optimally storing in multiple energy storage devices) and inventory control (meeting energy demand); there is a vast literature dedicated to these related subjects.
There are also many studies that consider the bidding aspect of the electricity markets: Löhndorf and Minner [2010] considers a day-ahead problem bidding problem slightly different from ours using an infinite horizon MDP; Conejo et al. [2002] solves a price-taker bidding problem using a deterministic look-ahead policy; Gross and Finlay [2000] formulate a constrained optimization problem for optimal bidding in a competitive power pool; and David [1993] develops both deterministic and stochastic models for bidding under the consideration of other market players. For more details, the literature survey by Wen and David [2000] provides an excellent overview to strategic bidding. The significant difference between these studies and our paper is that, rather than placing many bids at once, we consider a sequential, hourly bidding problem (albeit simpler in some respects due to our assumptions of being a price taker and having a relatively small generator, a 1 MW battery). Our problem structure represents current policies for real-time storage bidding at NYISO and other grid operators. Because of the requirement to bid an hour in advance, our state variable has to include not only the current charge level of the battery, but also the bids made in the previous hour (along with any side variables such as temperature or demand used in models of spot prices).
From an algorithmic point of view, a sequential decision problem can be modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Assuming that the state space is properly discretized and the relevant probability distributions are known, MDPs can be solved via the backward dynamic programming algorithm (BDP); see Puterman [1994] . A well-known drawback of using dynamic programming is that every state for every time t needs to be visited, which requires significant computing resources.
In the case of real-world problems with large state spaces, BDP is typically not a viable solution strategy, so we often use approximate dynamic programming (ADP) techniques. In this paper, we consider a variant of the approximate value iteration (AVI) algorithm (see both Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996] and Powell [2011] ) that exploits the monotonicity in certain dimensions of the optimal value function (also known as the cost-to-go function) in order to quickly approximate the shape of the value function. The algorithm, called Monotone-ADP, is analyzed in Jiang and Powell [2013] and was used previously as a heuristic in Papadaki and Powell [2003] .
Like monotonicity, convexity/concavity also often arise in applications, and similar algorithms to Monotone-ADP that exploit these structural properties have been studied in Godfrey and Powell [2001] , Topaloglu and Powell [2003] , Powell et al. [2004] , and Nascimento and Powell [2009] . In general, the above studies on monotonicity and convexity have shown that it is advantageous to use the structural properties of value functions in ADP algorithms.
Mathematical Formulation
We can formulate the problem mathematically as follows. Let M be the number of settlements made per hour and let ∆t = 1/M be the time increment between settlements (in hours). For example, in the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), settlements occur every 5 minutes, so we choose M = 12. Although settlements are made intra-hour, bidding decisions are always made on the hour, for an hour in the future. Thus, the operator places bids at 1pm to operate the battery between 2 and 3pm, with settlements made in 5 minute intervals within the hour. For time indexing, we use t (measured in hours); bidding decisions are made when t ∈ N and settlements occur when t ∈ T = {k · ∆t : k ∈ N}.
Let the price P t for t ∈ T be a discrete-time, nonnegative, stochastic process. Due to the fact that bidding decisions and settlements occur on two different schedules (every hour versus every ∆t), we use the following notation. For t ∈ N, let P (t,t+1] be an M -dimensional vector that represents the spot prices that occurred within the hour from t to t + 1:
Hence, P (t,t+1] does not become fully known until time t + 1. Next, let our set of bidding decisions be a finite set B such that
be the bidding decision made at t used for the interval (t + 1, t + 2]. All sell bids, b + t , (or "positive" bids because we are transferring at a rate of +1 MW) less than the spot price are picked up for dispatch (releasing energy into the grid). All buy bids, b − t , (or "negative" bids because we are transferring at a rate of −1 MW) greater than the spot price are picked up for charge. If the spot price falls in between the two bids, we are out of the market and the battery stays in an idle state. When we are obligated to sell to the market but are unable to deliver, we are penalized K · P t , where K ≥ 0. The restriction of b − t ≤ b + t guarantees that we are never obligated to buy and sell simultaneously. We remark that in the actual bidding process, the buy bid is a negative number and the criteria for clearing the market is that the bid is less than the negative of the spot price. Due to our bids being for only two quantities (±1 MW), the above reformulation of the bidding process is cleaner and more intuitive.
Let R t ∈ R = {0, 1, 2, . . . , R max } be the energy stored in the battery. For simplicity, assume that R max is adjusted so that a unit of resource represents 1/M MWh of energy. Thus, it is clear that at each settlement within the hour, the change in resource is either +1, −1, or 0. We also define a deterministic function that maps a vector of intra-hour prices
where e m is a vector of zeros with a one at the m-th row (and thus, picks out the mth component of the price vector P ). Note that q is not dependent on time, but in the context of our hour-ahead bidding problem, we use it in the form of q(P (t−1,t] , b t−2 ), which is deterministic at time t. Figure 1 illustrates the intra-hour behavior. 
For a fixed vector of intra-hour prices P ∈ R M , the following componentwise inequality holds:
Proof. This relationship follows directly from (3).
The above Proposition shows that increasing either component of the bid causes an overall net decrease in the amount of energy transferred to the market. Intuitively, increasing the sell bid makes it more difficult to sell to the market while increasing the buy bid makes it easier to buy from the market (these statements are equivalent in terms of energy flow).
To define the hourly transition function between R t and R t+1 , we model each of the individual settlements within the hour and then combine them recursively (since from t to t + 1, we settle M times). Let q s ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
M be a vector of settlement outcomes and suppose g R m (R t , q s ) represents the amount of resource after the m-th settlement. Thus, we have g
for 1 ≤ m ≤ M . The intra-hour resource levels are
R be the hourly transition function, which is defined as a composition of the functions g R M and q in the following way:
The need for an hourly transition function from R t directly to R t+1 (rather than simply defining the sub-transitions between the intra-hour settlements) is due to the hourly decision epoch of the problem. Proof. From (4), it is clear that the transition from g
is nondecreasing in the value of g m and nonincreasing in the value of e m q s . Thus, a simple induction argument shows that for r 1 , r 2 ∈ R and q 1 , q 2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1} M where r 1 ≤ r 2 and q 1 ≤ q 2 ,
The result follows by applying Proposition 1.
We now consider another dimension to our problem by allowing a limit to be imposed on the number of charge-discharge cycles used by the battery, for the sake of increasing the lifetime of the battery. Battery cycle-life (the approximate number of cycles before capacity diminishes to around 80%), a key issue when considering economic feasibility, varies between the different types of battery technologies and the operating conditions, but are typically in the range of 1000 (e.g., lead-acid) to 5000 (e.g., vanadium redox); for an extensive review, see Yang et al. [2011] . In our correspondence with industry colleagues, we found that a common (though possibly somewhat conservative) estimate of battery usage is 300 cycles/year, meaning that most devices can last at least 3 to 4 years. However, the model developed in this paper is for hourly decision making and it would be impractical to solve the model for time-horizons of several years. Note that different batteries technologies degrade in different ways, but in general, degradation occurs slowly (nearly linearly with chargedischarge cycles) at first, but after a point, efficiency drops much more rapidly.
Over a short horizon (on the order of days), the effects of battery degradation is negligible, but we propose the following way for one to impose a sort of artificial limit to the number of trades (charge-discharge cycles) performed. Let L t ∈ L = {0, 1, 2, . . . , L max } be decremented on every discharge of the battery (starting with L 0 = L max ) and suppose that when selling to the market at a settlement time t in (t, t + 1], the revenue is discounted by a factor of β(L t ) where β : L → [0, 1] is a nondecreasing function. Depending on the battery technology, preferences of the operator, and the time-horizon of the model, the choice of β may vary greatly; the list below offers a few examples:
n for some n > 1 and all l ∈ L, where (4) seeks to very roughly mimic the efficiency degradation of a real battery. We assume that the physical characteristics of the battery are summarized through β and the dynamics of L t , which we now describe.
Similar to the specification of q in (3), we define a function d :
which indicates the settlements for which a discharge occurred. Like before, we define the transition function from L t to L t+1 using a sequence of sub-transitions. Let d s ∈ {0, 1}
M be a vector of settlement outcomes (in this case, whether a discharge happened or not) and
Proposition 3. For an initial l ∈ L, a vector of intra-hour prices P ∈ R M , and a bid
Proof. First, the transition (7) is nondecreasing in g L m and nonincreasing in e m d s . Like in Proposition 2, induction shows that for l 1 , l 2 ∈ L and
At time t, we can determine the profit from the previous hour (t − 1, t]; call the profit function C, which depends on the initial resource R t−1 , the intra-hour prices P (t,t+1] , and the bid placed in the previous hour, b t−2 . The revenue made at the m-th settlement depends on four terms, the price P t+m∆t , the settlement outcome q m (P, b) (which establishes the direction of energy flow), a discount factor γ m (due to L t ), and the undersupply penalty U m . Let r ∈ R, l ∈ L, P ∈ R M , and b ∈ B. Since we discount only when selling to the market, let
The undersupply penalty takes values of either 1 (no penalty) or −K (penalty):
Hence, we can write the following sum (over the settlements) to arrive at the hourly profit:
(10) Note that C is not time-dependent. The timeline of events and notation we used is summarized in Figure 2 .
revenue/cost at settlement m Figure 2 . Illustration of the Bidding Process 3.1. Markov Decision Process. The problem of optimizing profits over a time horizon is a sequential decision problem that we can formulate as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). First, suppose the set of state variables associated with the price process P t is denoted P S t , with P S t ∈ P. The MDP can be characterized by the following components: -The state variable for the overall problem is S t = (R t , L t , b t−1 , P S t ) ∈ S where S is the state space. The previous bid b t−1 is included because it is the bid that becomes valid at time t for the interval (t, t + 1] and is necessary for computing the resource transition function. -The decision is the hour-ahead bid
that is active for the interval (t + 1, t + 2]. Since the bidding decision is made at time t, we are unable to see information such as the resource in the battery for the interval (t + 1, t + 2], denoted by R t+1 , as it depends on the random prices that occur after t.
-The exogenous information in this problem is the price process P t .
-The state transition function or system model S M is given by
-The contribution function in this model represents the expected value of the profit in the interval from t + 1 to t + 2 using bid b t given the current state S t . Define:
The double subscript of t and t + 2 signifies that the contribution is determined at t (hence, variables indexed by t ≤ t are not random) but represents the expectation of the profit in the interval (t + 1, t + 2]. -Let T be the last time for which a bid needs to be placed (hence, the trading horizon lasts until T + 2) and let B π t : S → B be the decision function for a policy π from the class Π of all admissible policies. The following is the objective function for maximizing expected profits:
We can express the optimal policy in the form of a stochastic dynamic program using Bellman's equation, using the optimal value function V * , defined for each t and each state S t :
(13) Figure 3 illustrates the above notation. Notice that at any decision epoch t, both the contribution and value functions are looking one step ahead, i.e., from t + 1 onwards, in the form of an expectation. Because of this, the profits from t to t + 1 become, in a sense, irrelevant. However, the link between the time periods comes from the dependence of R t+1 and L t+1 on R t , L t , and b t−1 (and of course, the random prices). In other words, at time t, our bid has to be placed for (t + 1, t + 2] with an uncertain amount of resource, R t+1 in the battery. It is important to note that it is precisely because C t,t+2 (S t , b t ) does not include the profit made in (t, t + 1] that allows us to show the important structural property of monotonicity for C t,t+2 in b t−1 (see Proposition 4 in the next section). Figure 3 . Illustration of the Dynamic Programming Notation 3.2. Structural Analysis. In this section, we provide some results regarding the structure of the contribution and value functions. The algorithm (Monotone-ADP-Bidding) that we implement to solve for the optimal value functions is inspired by the monotonicity properties that we now discuss.
Proof. First, we argue that the profit function C(r, l, P, b) defined in (10) is nondecreasing in r and l. From their respective definitions, equations (8) and (9), we can see that γ m and U m are both nondecreasing in their first arguments. These arguments can be written in terms of r and l through the transition functions g R m and g L m . Applying Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, we can confirm that C(r, l, P, b) is nondecreasing in r and l. Next, by (12),
Again, applying Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 (for m = M ), we see that the term inside the expectation is nondecreasing in R t , b − t−1 , and b + t−1 (composition of nondecreasing functions) for any outcome of P (t,t+1] and P (t+1,t+2] . Thus, the expectation itself is nondecreasing.
Proposition 5. The optimal value function V * t (S t ), with Powell [2011] ). Thus, we can rewrite the optimality equation (13) as:
The proof is by backward induction on t. The base case is t = T and since V * T (·) is zero for any state s ∈ S, the nondecreasing property is true. Notice that the state transition function (11) satisfies the following property. Suppose we have a fixed action b t and two
Then, for any realization of the intra-hour prices P (t,t+1] (by Propositions 2 and 3),
with R t+1 ≤ R t+1 and L t+1 ≤ L t+1 , meaning that the transition function satisfies a specialized nondecreasing property. Using this and supposing that V * t+1 (·) satisfies the statement of the proposition (induction hypothesis), it is clear that V b t (S t , b t ) is nondecreasing in R t , L t , and b t−1 . Now, by the previous proposition, we see that the term inside the maximum of (16) is nondecreasing in R t , L t , and b t−1 for any action b t . Hence, this must also be the case for the maximizing action; the inductive step is complete.
As previously mentioned, a structural property like monotonicity can be incredibly useful for estimating an approximate value function when the optimal value function is intractable for computation. In fact, in our proposed solution using approximate dynamic programming, monotonicity is the property that we exploit.
Algorithmic Technique
The traditional way to solve for the optimal value functions in (13) is by backward dynamic programming. Due to the fact that this technique requires us to visit every state (which is computationally difficult), we propose the use of approximate dynamic programming. We first note that both methods require a finite state space. Since R, L and B were assumed to be finite, we need to assume, in particular, that P is also finite or that it is properly discretized.
The idea behind our ADP algorithm, which we call Monotone-ADP-Bidding (see Jiang and Powell [2013] ) is to iteratively learn approximations V n t (S t ) (n iterations) of V * t (S t ) that obey the structural property of monotonicity. The algorithm is a form of asynchronous (or approximate) value iteration (AVI), so for each time t in iteration n, only one state S n t is visited. In addition, at each step, we perform a monotonicity preservation step to ensure the approximation is structurally similar to V * t . We show experimentally that failure to maintain monotonicity, despite the availability of convergence proofs, produces an algorithm that simply does not work in practice.
4.1. Preliminaries. Let v n t (S n t ) be an observation of the value of being in state S n t at iteration n and time t. Define the noise term
to be the difference between the observation and the optimal value using the iteration n − 1 approximation. We remark, for the sake of clarity, that this is not the noise representing the deviation from the true value, V * t (S n t ). In that case (ifv n t (S n t ) were replaced with V * t (S n t )), we would have the equation for the temporal difference (see e.g. Sutton and Barto [1998] ). Rather, w n t (S n t ) is the noise from an inability to exactly observe the optimal value of maximization problem: max bt∈B C t,t+2 (S t , b t ) + E(V n−1 t+1 (S t+1 )|S t ) . Thus, we can rearrange to arrive at:
Before we continue, let us define a partial order on the state space S so that for s i = (r i , l i , b i , p i ) where r i ∈ R, l i ∈ L, b i ∈ B, and p i ∈ P for i = 1, 2, we have that s 1 s 2 if and only if the following are satisfied:
The values of any two states that can be related by can be compared using Proposition 5. The main idea of the algorithm is that every observationv n t (S n t ) is smoothed with the previous estimate of the value of S n t and the resulting smoothed estimate z n t (S n t ) can be used to generalize to the rest of the state space by means of a monotonicity preserving operator, Π M . Let s ∈ S be an arbitrary state that has a current estimated value of v. After z n t (S n t ) is known, Π M adjusts the value of s in the following way:
First, we note that if monotonicity is already satisfied, then nothing changes because in the second and third cases of (15), we get that z n t ∨ v = v and z n t ∧ v = v, respectively. If, however, monotonicity is violated, then the newly observed value z n t prevails and replaces the previous value of v. Figure 4 shows an example of this operation for the two bids b − t−1 and b + t−1 . In the illustration, assume that the observations are made for fixed values of R t and L t , but note that when we run the algorithm, this adjustment is made over all four dimensions.
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Figure 4. Illustration of Monotonicity Preservation
The stepsize sequence used for smoothing in new observations with the previous approximation is denoted α n t , which can be thought of as a (possibly stochastic) sequence in n, for each t. Furthermore, states that are not visited do not get updated unless the update is made through the operator Π M , so we also define: α n t (s) = α n t · 1 {s=S n t } . For notational purposes, let us also define the history of the algorithm until iteration n by the filtration
Algorithm Description and Convergence.
The full description of the algorithm is given in Figure 5 below. Monotone-ADP-Bidding can be shown to be converge (see Jiang and Powell [2013] for the full proof, based on earlier results by Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996] and Nascimento and Powell [2009] ). We reproduce the set of assumptions and the resulting theorem here.
Assumption 1. For all s ∈ S and t ≤ T ,
i.e, every state is visited infinitely often (see the Extended Borel-Cantelli Lemma in Breiman [1992] ).
Assumption 2. The optimal value functions V * t (s) and the observationsv n t (S n t ) are nonnegative and bounded by a constant V max .
Assumption 3. The following hold regarding the noise sequence w n t :
Step 0a. Initialize V 0 t (s) = 0 for each t ≤ T − 1 and s ∈ S.
Step 0b. Set V n T (s) = 0 for each s ∈ S and n ≤ N .
Step 0c. Set n = 1.
Step 1.
Select an initial state S n 0 .
Step 2.
For t = 0, 1, . . . , (T − 1):
Step 2a. Sample a noisy observation:
Step 2b. Smooth in the new observation with previous value:
Step 2c. Perform monotonicity projection operator. For each s ∈ S:
Step 2d. Choose the next state S n t+1 given F n−1 .
Step 3.
If n < N , increment n and return Step 1. (ii)
Theorem. Under Assumptions 1-4, for each t ≤ T and s ∈ S, the estimates V n t (s) produced by the Monotone-ADP-Bidding Algorithm of Figure 5 , converge to the optimal value functions V * t (s) almost surely. Proof. The full proof for a generalized MDP with monotone value functions is given in Jiang and Powell [2013] . 4.3. Approximating the Expectation. Our algorithm can be applied with any model of spot prices P t , with the caveat that more complex models generally require a higher dimensional state space. These include diffusion models (i.e., Schwartz [1997] , Cartea and Figueroa [2005] , ), which often incorporate features such as OrnsteinUhlenbeck processes, jump terms, and regime switching. Recently, there has also been interest in structural models of electricity prices, where the underlying supply, demand, and bid-stack behavior is taken into account; see Carmona and Coulon [2012] for a survey.
Regardless, almost any model without finite support requires the approximation of an expectation using a sample mean in Step 2a of the Monotone-ADP-Bidding algorithm (see Figure 5 ). Doing so, however, can cause us to lose the convergence theory. Recall that both terms inside the max operator are expectations, so we can rewrite Step 2a of the algorithm as:v
If both the expectation and the maximum can be computed exactly, then the noise term w 
We can solve the following sample average approximation (SAA) problem: 
meaning that we reduce the noise w n t (S n t ) to 0 as we increase the number of samples. However, for any fixed I, the following inequality holds (due to an interchange of the conditional expectation and the max operator):
Unfortunately, this means that there is an upward bias (which vanishes asymptotically) in the noise term: E(w n+1 t (s)|F n ) ≥ 0 and Assumption 3(i) is no longer satisfied.
Post-Decision Algorithm.
Using the idea of a post-decision state (see Powell [2011] ), we can make a small adjustment to the algorithm, so that Assumption 3(i) is satisfied. In the case of the hourly bidding problem, the post-decision state S b t is the state-action pair (S t , b t ). Oftentimes, post-decision states help simplify the computational aspect of an MDP, but unfortunately, for this problem instance, the post-decision state space is higher dimensional than the pre-decision state space. Let S 
, where S t+1 is understood to be a function of b t .
Notice that we can rewrite Bellman's optimality equation as:
Instead of attempting to learn V * t , the general idea now is to algorithmically learn the postdecision value functions V b t using the relation (16) and to implement the policy by solving
Not surprisingly, the post-decision value functions V b t also satisfy a monotonicity property, over six dimensions. 
be the iteration n approximation of the post-decision value function, S b, n t be the state visited by the algorithm in iteration n,v b, n t−1 (S b, n t−1 ) be an observation of V b t−1 (S b, n t−1 ) using the iteration n − 1 approximation, w b, n t−1 (S b, n t−1 ) be the observation noise, F b, n be a filtration defined analogously to F n , and Π b M be the monotonicity preservation operator on S b defined analogously to Π M . The revised algorithm for post-decision states is shown in Figure 6 below.
Step 0a. Initialize V b, 0 t (s) = 0 for each t ≤ T − 1 and s ∈ S b .
Step 0b. Set V b, n T (s) = 0 for each s ∈ S b and n ≤ N .
Step 1. Select an initial state S
For t = 0, . . . , (T − 1):
Step 2c. Perform monotonicity projection operator. For each s ∈ S b :
Step 2d. Choose the next state S b, n t given F b, n−1 .
Step 3. If n < N , increment n and return Step 1. An analogous convergence theorem can be shown for the post-decision version of the Monotone-ADP-Bidding Algorithm (the proof of the original theorem with a small adjustment can be used). The advantage to applying this revised algorithm is that even when we cannot compute the expectation in Step 2a and must rely on sample paths, we can still easily satisfy Assumption 3(i), unlike in the pre-decision case. To do so, we simply use:
where we transition from S b t−1 to S t using a single, sample outcome of prices P (t−1,t] . Hence, Assumption 3(i) is trivially satisfied.
However, due to the higher dimensional state space (minimum of five dimensions when we do not consider L t and P S t ), this algorithm is can be difficult to run without extensive computational resources. The fact that four of the dimensions are bids (which are generally more finely discretized than the resource level) exacerbates the issue. Therefore, in the numerical work of Sections 5 and 6, we apply the pre-decision version of the algorithm. 4.5. Stepsize Selection. The selection of the stepsize α n t , also known as a learning rate, can have a profound effect on the speed of convergence of an ADP algorithm. A common example of stepsize rule that satisfies Assumption 4 is simply:
which is equivalent to computing an average of all previous observations. The issue is that this method weighs all observations equally, even though we know that the error can be extremely large in early iterations of any ADP algorithm. See Chapter 11 of Powell [2011] for an overview of the numerous available stepsize rules.
In the numerical work of this paper, we choose to employ a stochastic stepsize rule (where the value of α n t adjusts according to the sequence of past observations), the bias-adjusted Kalman Filter (BAKF), which was developed in George and Powell [2006] . The main idea behind BAKF is to choose α n t such that the mean squared error to the true value function is minimized. In order to do so, we define the error to be:
and along the way, we keep track of estimates of the biasβ n t , the variance of the biasν n t , and the variance of the error (σ n t )
2 . Also, let η n be a stepsize used for recursively constructing these estimates; in our case, we let η n t be determined by a harmonic stepsize rule. The BAKF rule is given by:
Finally, the termλ n t is a coefficient in the equation for the variance of the smoothed estimate (see George and Powell [2006] for more details) and can be written recursively as:
Benchmarking on a Stylized Problem
In this section, we present results of running Monotone-ADP-Bidding and traditional AVI on a small, tractable problem (i.e., the optimal solution is computable) in order to show the advantages of using Π M . See Jiang and Powell [2013] for benchmarking results on a suite of 3 and 4-dimensional test problems. In this section, we consider a 5-dimensional problem, where the fifth dimension contains two states. We first describe some simplifications to make benchmarking possible, then argue that the assumptions to the convergence theorem are satisfied, and finally show the numerical results.
In order to benchmark the algorithm against a truly optimal solution, we make some simplifying assumptions (to be relaxed in the following sections) so that backward dynamic programming can be used to compute an optimal solution. First, we suppose that P t has finite support and that M = 1, so that the exact value of E V t+1 (S t+1 )|S t can be computed easily. When M is larger (see the next two sections), we can only compute an approximation to the expectation, due to the fact that an exponential in M number of outcomes of the price process need to be considered for an exact result.
For the purpose of benchmarking, we now describe a simple and tractable model of electricity spot prices, a Markov Regime-Switching model with two regimes, denoted by the process X t . We represent the normal regime as X t = 0 and the spike regime as X t = 1. Let S(t) be a deterministic seasonal component, t be discrete, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables representing noise in the normal regime, and s t be discrete, i.i.d. random variables representing noise in the spike regime. The price process can be written as:
. Also, we define the transition probabilities of the (time-inhomogenous) Markov chain X t :
Because X t only takes two states, let p(t) = p 0,1 (t) (the probability, at time t, of moving from the normal regime into the spike regime) and q(t) = p 1,0 (t) (the probability, at time t, of returning to the normal regime). The transition matrix for X t is thus:
Because the price process P t has finite support and the expectation can be computed exactly, we see that both Assumptions 2 (boundedness of P t =⇒ boundedness of C t =⇒ boundedness of V * t ) and 3 (the noise sequence w n t is zero) are satisfied. Assumption 1 is satisfied by introducing exploration -in this case, we use an epsilon-greedy approach.
In order to generate a small library of test problems, we considered two versions of the seasonal component: S 1 (t) = 15 · sin(2πt/12) + 50, S 2 (t) = 15 · cos(2πt/12) + 50.
We roughly model the fact that price spikes tend to occur more frequently when demand is high. Since demand is often modeled using sinusoidal functions, we use the following for p(t) (the probability of moving from the normal regime to the spike regime) when the seasonal component is S t (t): p 1 (t) = α p · sin(2πt/12) + 1 /2, for some parameter α p ≤ 1, representing the maximum probability of moving to the spike regime: p t (t) ∈ [0, α p ]. Similarly, when the seasonal component is S 2 (t), we use:
In these numerical results, q(t), the probability of returning to the normal regime, is always modeled as a constant α q . Moreover, both t and s t have support {−10, −9, −8, . . . , +39, +40} and are distributed according to the discrete pseudonormal distribution, defined in Salas and Powell [2013] . The skewed support allows us to model the preponderance of upward spikes in electricity spot prices. For the noise in the normal regime t , we take µ X = 0 and σ X = 7 and for the noise in the spike regime s t , we take µ X = 15 and σ X = 20. We also set b min = 15 and b max = 85, discretized into 30 grid points in each dimension. In line with the operation procedures of the NYISO, the undersupply penalty parameter K is set to 1 in our simulations -this means that if one is unable to deliver energy to the market, then the penalty is precisely the current spot price (essentially, we are paying another generator to produce the energy instead). The remainder of the parameters vary across the test problems and are summarized in Table 1 We ran both Monotone-ADP-Bidding (M-ADP) and traditional AVI for 10,000 iterations on each of the test problems. Note that Proposition 4.6 of Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996] establishes that the version of AVI that we run (equivalent to Monotone-ADP-Bidding without the Π M operator) is a convergent algorithm. This comparison thus aims to show that for our bidding and battery arbitrage application, we can dramatically increase the rate of convergence by using Π M . To evaluate the policies generated by these two algorithms, we first computed the optimal solution using BDP. Next, we use the method from Powell [2011] , outlined below, to produce a percentage of optimality for each of the approximate policies. Note that for any generic set of value functions V (not necessarily optimal), we can write a decision function in the following way (based on the principle of dynamic programming):
Then, for a sample path ω ∈ Ω,
is a sample outcome of the profit by bidding under the policy produced by V . To evaluate the value of a policy, we use a test set of I = 1000 sample paths {ω i , 1 ≤ i ≤ I} and consider the empirical mean:
Finally, we compare the value of an approximate policy toF (V * ) (where V * is generated using BDP) in order to determine the percent of optimality.
The results of the benchmarking are summarized in Table 2 below. It is clear that M-ADP provides significantly better solutions than AVI, particularly in the early iterations. By exploiting the structure of the problem, M-ADP provides solutions that are 90% of optimal in some cases (Problems C and E) in 1000 iterations while AVI reaches at most 43% (Problem C). In 1000 iterations, the worst case for M-ADP was 75% (Problem E) while the worst performance for AVI was as low as 17% of optimal (Problem B). The results for larger N show that M-ADP (except in the case of Problem B) quickly produces a near-optimal solution. Table 3 compares the computation times of M-ADP and BDP. We can see that, even when utilizing parallel computation for computing the optimal policy using BDP, a reasonably good solution can often be found using M-ADP in a fraction of the time. For example, for Problem F , we can produce a solution that is approximately 90% of optimal in N = 6000 iterations, or about 6 · 122.5 = 735 minutes, whereas the optimal policy requires 2503.1 minutes on a parallel processor, and 20,000 minutes on a single processor.
Obviously, the above problem has been simplified in order for us to be able to tractably compute the optimal policy. A more realistic price process coupled with finer discretization and more resource states (since for M = 12, we would need to consider a larger R max ) would easily produce a problem for which BDP becomes prohibitively difficult. In these cases, M-ADP would be both an attractive and feasible solution technique, as we demonstrate in the next section on a problem using real data. As previously mentioned, for almost any price process without finite support, it is necessary for us to approximate the expectation using random samples. In this section, we propose an alternative idea: instead of taking the sample mean of random samples from a stochastic model, we can simply construct the sample mean using historical data. In this experiment, we use 5-minute real-time spot price data from the New York City zone of the NYISO. The idea is to train an ADP model using the Monotone-ADP-Bidding algorithm on spot prices from 2011 and test the policies using data from 2012; both data sets are shown in Figure 7 . Due to computational limitations, we use the pre-decision version of the algorithm, which uses a lower dimensional state space than the post-decision version. However, since we do not have mean-zero noise, Assumption 3(i) is not satisfied and we can only consider the following method to be a heuristic. The design of the bidding policy is summarized by the following.
-Due to the fact that the characteristics of the spot prices can be very different on weekends (see ), we considered weekdays only. -In order to have a larger set of training data, we assume that spot prices of a particular hour are identically distributed across weekdays of the same month. -We set T = 24 (daily horizon) and train a set of daily value functions for each month of the year. In essence, we combine the data for the weekdays of each month to produce a policy that is "valid" for any given weekday of the same month. -To reduce both the computational time and the amount of data needed, the policy does not depend on the current price -the state variable is reduced to 3 dimensions. -Based on conversations with industry colleagues, we modeled a 1 MW, 6 MWh battery. Since M = 12, we set R max = 72. There is a lack of information regarding the decay profiles of these batteries, and thus, we did not model the aging process of the battery (i.e., L max = 0 and β(l) = 1). We set b min = 0 and b max = 150 and discretized each dimension into 50 grid points. Like before, we set the undersupply penalty parameter K to 1. We report the monthly and yearly profits for 2012 after running Montone-ADP-Bidding for N = 5000 and N = 10000 iterations on the 2011 training data in Table 4 . Note that these results exclude weekends and are for a single battery. For a typical industrial battery plant consisting of 20 batteries, we expect to generate profits of approximately $1.15 million using this solution method.
Train
Test Monthly Profit N = 5000 N = 10000 Examining the results, we see that the policy produced lower revenues during the winter months of December, January and February. Figure 7 shows that for these months in particular, there is a large discrepancy between the spot price behavior in the winter months of 2011 and the winter months of 2012. One alternative that can be considered in practice would be to train a policy on data from the current month and implement the policy in the next month, especially when there is no change in seasons (i.e. March to April). When powerful computational resources are available, it would also be beneficial to train policies for longer horizons, such as weekly or monthly rather than daily.
Conclusion
In this paper, we describe an hour-ahead bidding and battery arbitrage problem for a realtime electricity market (e.g. NYISO's real-time market). We then formulate the problem mathematically as an MDP and show that the optimal value function satisfies a monotonicity property, a structural result that can be exploited in order to accelerate the convergence of ADP algorithms. The algorithm that we employ is called Monotone-ADP-Bidding and uses monotonicity to infer the value of states nearby an observed state. When benchmarked against a traditional AVI algorithm, we found that the improvements in terms of solution quality were drastic. Furthermore, the ADP algorithm can reach near-optimal solutions without the need for significant computational time and power (which BDP certainly requires). Finally, we show a method where we can train value functions with Monotone-ADP-Bidding using historical spot prices -this removes the need for us to specify and fit an accurate stochastic model of spot prices. Testing the approximate policy on data from the subsequent year, we found that our policy is indeed profitable.
